1 Supreme + 1 Supreme = 2 Supremes

At Vatican II, Lumen Gentium (LG) declared two supremes.  Prior to 1965, there was a clear answer to: how many supremes does it take to change a light bulb?  Unfortunately, that clarity has now been lost.  This is, seriously, a thorny problem.  The supremacy section from Lumen Gentium  22 provides the starting point.

 

“The order of bishops, which succeeds to the college of apostles and gives this apostolic body continued existence, is also the subject of supreme and full power over the universal Church, provided we understand this body together with its head the Roman Pontiff and never without this head.  This power can be exercised only with the consent of the Roman Pontiff.”

 

To simplify, “is also the subject of” will be replaced by “also has,” and the “order of bishops” replaced with “college of bishops” as the distinction isn't important here.  The simplified text becomes:

 

“The college of bishops also has supreme and full power over the universal Church, but can only exercise that power with the Pope’s consent.”

 

Did a light bulb just burn out?  In treating the Unity of God (Summa Q11), Saint Thomas Aquinas said if there were two infinite beings, either 1) the perfections in both are different which implies neither are perfect and thus neither are infinite; or 2) the perfections are identical in which the infinite beings are actually the same being.  Therefore, there is exactly one God.

The logic is similar for supreme power.  Two entities cannot both be supreme.  To belabor, if two supreme entities existed, they must have separate wills.  But if both are supreme, the wills must be identical; hence, there can be only one supreme entity.  LG asserts “supreme power” and then immediately makes it conditional.  This is “subordinate power” by definition.  So does LG actually maintain there are two supreme entities?  Actually yes: the magic is two different definitions of “has supreme power.”

The contentious definition is the second regarding collegiate supremacy, which has multiple components.  The main components deals with the two senses of “has.”  The secondary sense is the inclusion sense of “has supreme power.”  Namely, every group with the Supreme Pontiff as a member “has” supreme power with respects to inclusion.  From the inclusion perspective, LG can be likened to a bunch of subordinates with a snake in the grass telling them they can be like superiors.  But all superior/inferior relationships can be phrased as in LG.  For example, the lower courts have supreme power to decide all cases, but only can exercise that power with the Supreme Court’s consent.

But more is going than that.  Further, the prior example is not direct analog to Lumen Gentium.  A better rendition would be: boy master marries slave girl with couple having complete autonomy but only with permission of husband.  Welcome to LG.  One might suspect this illustrious couple had a colorful courtship.  Indeed, such was the case.

 

The underlying doctrinal question was nothing new: where is the supreme power?  Also, it is not surprising that determining which of the three cups that covered the pea took center stage at Vatican II.  Furthermore, with the magician minority majority authority running the show, all of the subsequent sleight of hand could safely be predicted though not necessarily detected.

“The most important and dramatic battle”¹ in the Council regarded collegiality.  There were three views on where supreme power resided: I) head, II) body/head with head representing body, III) head and also body/head in union with head.  Translating this into pea soup: I) Pope is the sole pea, II) College is the sole pea with the Pope the master cook, III) Pope is pea one with College pea two wherein pea two has identical color and taste of pea one.

Paul VI had a solid understanding of the issue, even before becoming Pope, and stayed abreast of the topic.  At the Council, he sided with view III: the two peas.  But with deafening deafness, he remained deaf to Archbishop Stafifa’s repeated warnings that the proposed schema defining these relationships was contrary to the common teaching of the Popes, Church Fathers/Doctors, all the way down the line.

Stafifa also showed the new schema was essentially identical to one, from 140 years prior, by Father Giovanni Bolgeni, which had long ago been unanimously rejected by theologians and canonists as incompatible with “the sound tradition of the Church.”²

Therefore, Archbishop Stafifa, with more than 70 supporters (the required number), requested to speak before the vote took place, but was denied this right.  After the vote, the collegiality subcommision worked to address the 572 qualified affirmative votes, but Stafifa learned that their qualifications were being ignored.  He thus wrote a lengthy letter to Paul VI, who ordered an investigation into the charge that the schema contained “an extreme form of collegiality”³ and if Stafifa was illegally refused permission to speak.

Meanwhile, 35 Cardinals and 5 Superior Generals of large religious orders had written the Pope stating the schema didn’t express view III but rather was ambiguous, and could later be given an extreme liberal interpretation.  But Paul VI didn’t believe this and attacked their arguments, so the representing Cardinal personally explained the grounds for their suspicions.  The result: no action as in still no action.

This Cardinal then suggested a debate to be held in the Pope’s presence.  Paul VI rejected the idea though the Pope asked who his theologians were.  After naming three, “the Pope at once became visibly disturbed, since they were well known and he esteemed them highly.”⁴  But alas, he took no action citing i) the large majority vote and ii) the Council Fathers’ deep study and prayer.  The Cardinal disagreed, but Paul VI “still took no action because of his great faith in the Theological Commission.”⁵

Then providentially, one of the extreme liberals wrote down how some of the ambiguous passages would be interpreted after the Council.  This fell into the hands of the 35 Cardinals and 5 Superior Generals and subsequently was brought to the Pope.  “Pope Paul, realizing finally that he had been deceived, broke down and wept.”⁶

 

The LG text was considered to be without actual false statements, rather only containing ambiguous terms.  The solution was thus to clarify the ambiguities in the text itself, and to add a preamble called “the Preliminary Explanatory Note” to the schema.  This introduction, of course, was placed at the end of the document.

One significant clarification was the “This power can be exercised only with the consent of the Roman Pontiff”⁷ clause, which Paul VI expressively desired.  But all of Paul’s amendments had already been requested by those voting with a qualified yes, though these had previously been overruled by the Theological Commission: not for theological reasons but because they were contrary to the majority.  However now, some were placed into schema.  Additionally, the Theological Commission composed the draft of the “Postliminary” Note, which Paul VI then revised.

The qualifications, the replies and the Preliminary Explanatory Note were distributed to Council, who thought the Note originated from the Theological Commission because it began: “The Commission decrees that…”⁸  (shock: no “in union with the Pope” clause)

Two days later, it was announced that i) there was no violation of procedural rules (regarding Stafifa’s right to speak before the vote) and the doctrinal doubts were duly examined, ii) the chapter on collegiality was not to be understood as infallible, and iii) the chapter was to be understood “according to meaning and tenor”⁹ of the Note, though this time it was the Pope who called attention to the Note, and explicitly extended its interpretation to entire chapter, not just for the amendments.

With the ambiguities thus safely removed, and the Note enforcing full precision to the III position (head and also body/head in union with head), the vote on the chapter regarding collegiality could commence.  It was a massive landslide: only 10 voted against with 2,134 voting in favor.

 

The Explanatory Note delineates the III position via the “distinction between the Roman Pontiff taken separately and the Roman Pontiff together with the bishops.”¹⁰  But the latter has a circular element per self-inclusion: the Roman Pontiff cannot be taken “together with the bishops” because he is already and always within “the bishops.”

To analyze the circular body/head quagmire, let’s determine how the first pea has supreme power.  The Pope exercises power the same as everyone: the intellect forms ideas, the will then choses.  But the Holy Father possesses the primacy.  His acts are thus supreme within the proper realm.

The nature of supreme power within the College of Bishops is different as there isn’t an intellect/will per se but rather a collective.  It is logically possible for a collective to bear supreme power as a whole, for example via majority vote.  But distributed supreme power is excluded here since the Supreme Pontiff has the primacy.  Indeed, all Explanatory Note revisions dealt with expressing that the Pope has supreme power and “is always free to exercise this power.”¹¹

At this juncture, the primary sense of “has” will be considered, that is resides, which is the normal meaning of “is the subject of.”  Namely, “the subject” is the proper place where something resides in the philosophical sense.  Regarding supreme power, recall that the primacy of Peter is not immediate.  The direct primacy belongs to Jesus Christ because He alone is the Head of the Church.  The Vicar of Christ has primacy in the Church in terms of its visible governance.  Supreme power residing is thus a power decreed by Christ, a “sharing” in His primacy, as it pertains to the visible governance of the Church.

Obviously, supreme power is included within the College because the Pope is a member.  Furthermore, supreme power clearly resides in the head.  But for supreme power to reside in the College, it must have been invested with supreme power as a whole.  But the primacy, as LG notes, cannot be suppressed so the Pope always retains supreme power.  Thus, supreme power cannot reside in the College because it is impossible to meaningfully define two supreme powers with respect to free will.  This renders the schema invalid on logical grounds – under the normal definition of resides.

 

To unravel further, let’s examine the College in terms of its moving parts.  First, each Bishop has the power to deliberate on matters regarding the universal Church.  But this power can only be exercised collegially (Pope exempted), most prominently in Ecumenical Councils.

The deliberations of the Council Fathers, made by the body and sometimes the head, result in decrees.  Decrees approved by College are subject to the head for final approval (enactment), except in LG.  The Explanatory Note expounds as thus:

 

“the term ‘consent’ suggests rather communion between the head and the members, and implies the need for an act which belongs properly to the competence of the head.”¹²

 

Or does ‘consent’ more readily suggest mutual consent?  To be pedantic, let’s play the consenting adults game.  Two pieces on the board: i) College exercising supreme power and ii) Supreme Pontiff giving consent.  First case, the Supreme Pontiff’s consent is not an act of supreme power.  Here, collegiate supreme power is (absolutely) conditional on a non-supreme power.  Second case, the Supreme Pontiff’s consent is an act of supreme power.  This renders collegiate supreme power as (absolutely) conditional to a supreme power.

LG explains the phrasing of “the consent of its head” was used “to avoid the idea of dependence on some kind of outsider” wherein the motivation was to treat the College as a unity, as a “hierarchical communion”¹³, which indeed it is.  Yet, does this “consent” actual mean mutual consent wherein both the body and head each “consent” in exercising a separate but unified supreme power? 

The Explanatory Note states “since the Supreme Pontiff is head of the College, he alone is able to perform certain actions which are not at all within the competence of the bishops.”¹⁴  But is the whole collegiate act essentially unified?  Specifically, is the College a true supreme?  This is the substance of Romano Amerio’s question from his 1985 work, Iota Unum: “But the question arises, whether an authority that can be put into effect only by a superior authority can be considered supreme and does not amount to a purely virtual object, a thing existing only in the mind.”

 

Vatican II only considered three models.  A fourth model will be presented now, which begins with supreme power residing in the COLLEGE.  This resembles the II position: body/head with head representing body (i.e. College is the sole pea).

However, the perspective is the view from eternity: how Jesus Christ views His Church.  Though as that perspective is incomprehensible this side of Heaven, we need straw theology as in what Saint Thomas called his master work after being shown a glimpse of the heavenly realities. 

To this end, a concept from mathematics will be borrowed: algebra’s idea of homomorphic projections.  Or better, its extension to continuous functions: homeomorphic projections.  Simply put, a homeomorphic projection is a structure preserving function: it maps one set onto another, providing a simplified view by collapsing detail, while preserving certain structural features.

The first mapping in the fourth model is supreme power projected onto space and time in terms of free will.  Here, and now, the Supreme Pontiff is, well, the Supreme Pontiff.  For in terms of strict exercise of supreme power (enactment), there can only be one supreme.  For this projection, supreme power is contained and resides in the terminus: the Pope.

For the deliberation/determination component of supreme power, two more projections are needed to denote the two terminuses where this aspect of supreme power resides.  The first again maps the COLLEGE onto Supreme Pontiff with respects to the power to legislate for the universal Church.  But since Christ conferred the teaching office upon the Apostles (and their successors), a second projection is needed: the COLLEGE onto the College with respects to deliberation.  Here, “deliberation” resides in the College but it is a subordinate power which only the Supreme Pontiff can enable and terminate – “according to his own discretion.”¹⁵  Note that in the fourth model, the power of enactment is only contained in the College.

Note that LG is playing a shell game with power.  To paraphrase Saint Thomas: Power is the principle which executes that which reason knows and the will commands.  LG is using a broader sense, the exercise of power that incorporates the intellect/will with actual power.  This is reasonable enough.  It is the basis of the deliberation and enactment distinction, where enactment is power, strictly speaking; namely, the power to enact (execute).  It is this two-fold exercise of power that is at work when the Pope acts alone or within a Council.

Now, the fourth model also defines two supremes.  The first is the simple supreme of the Supreme Pontiff.  The second is a compound supreme comprised of the College (deliberation) and the Pope (enactment).  In general, a supreme can delegate the deliberation power, though the supreme always retains the right to participate in the deliberation.  In fine, there can only be one (simple) supreme, but potentially many compound supremes.

However, per Divine Constitution, the deliberation power only resides in the College (excepting the Pope) so there is exactly one compound supreme.    Finally, the Supreme Pontiff, naturally, has the sole power to control the College’s power to deliberate.  This resolves Romano’s objection regarding how a supreme could be “put into effect only by a superior authority.”  Namely, the College is not a supreme for only the power to deliberate resides within: the power that is being “put into effect.”

But the College as a compound supreme (the Roman Pontiff is a member) is a real, objective supreme.  In the anti-spirit of Vatican II, the fourth model could be non-ambiguously phrased as:

 

“The college of bishops is also the subject of supreme and full power to render decrees for the universal Church, but can only exercise that power with the Pope’s consent wherein said decrees can only be enacted by a supreme act of the Roman Pontiff.”

 

With model IV thus described, the question naturally arises: how do the different models line up? 

 

The traditional view was supreme power only resides in the head: model I.  The College would “share” in the Pope’s supreme power for Councils, with respects to deliberation.  LG’s model III rendered the sharing into a unity: the College is a supreme.

However functionally, LG essentially describes a compound supreme via the act belonging “properly to the competence of the head.”  But it does not make the abstraction nor does it explicitly differentiate between deliberation and enactment.  Most significantly though, it does not define what constitutes the unity regarding the collegiate act apart from alluding to hierarchical communion and the raw logical necessity.

Model IV is the middle ground between models I and III (i.e. average: in theology (I + III) / 2 = IV).  Like LG, it recognizes an inherent (subordinate) power in the College, but it explicitly names it and defines its relation to the principal component of supreme power: enactment.

In collegiate exercise of supreme power, outside the Vulcan Will Meld, the two acts are intrinsically separable.  The projection model conjectures a unity in the COLLEGE (Heaven’s view) by defining supreme power as residing within, but not so in the College, in which only deliberation power resides.  There is, of course, a unity of the two acts, but only by logical necessity: hierarchical communion is accidental here.  However, the College’s power is due precisely to its “unity” as the teaching authority was conferred upon the whole.  But this is an element of the Divine Constitution, not something for compound supremes in general (if there actually is another…).

LG presents the College as a latent supreme that is activated to power “only from time to time and only with the consent of its head.”¹⁶  Supreme power is said to reside within the College but LG doesn’t define exactly how.  Though apparently, supreme power as a whole is taken to reside in the College as a whole with the two parts taken as forming a unity.  This differs from Model IV’s mereology where the whole has a double reside that equates to containment.  Namely, deliberation resides in the College with enactment residing in the head, but supreme power as a whole is only contained in the College.

The question being framed is whether there is a difference between the unity implied in III and the strict separation described in IV.  For without a substantive unity, Lumen Gentium succeeded only in creating a mirage of III.

To some extent, Romano Amerio’s question provides the answer.  Romano was a peritus (expert) for Bishop Angelo Giuseppe Jelmini at Vatican II.  His asking indicates it was not discussed and thus not voted on.  As the earth shattering clauses of the Pope having supreme power were newly added in describing the Church’s Divine Constitution, expecting great finesse is unwarranted.

The scramble to patch LG leaves little reason to believe the Council Fathers understood “is also the subject of” to mean much beyond their perceived achievement of expounding the III position.  But functionally, it is hard to distinguish LG’s College from a compound supreme.  Conceptually, per sola suprema logic, it is hard to distinguish LG from nonsense.  All in all, Lumen Gentium has all the earmarks of being Conciliarism’s latest hurray with Vatican II proclaiming itself to be the Trinity or something.  This is borne out by the collegiate chapter being declared non-infallible on the spot.

 

Speaking of who is like God, Pope Francis issued the Apostolic Constitution Episcopalis Communio in 2018.  Decrees by the Synod of Bishops are now magisterial provided the Pope approves, which are published in the joint name of the Pope and the Synod.  This is a development of Apostolica Sollicitudo which was promulgated at the end of Vatican II and established the Synod of Bishops.

Originally, the Synod of Bishops has “the function of providing information and offering advice.” (II of Apostolica Sollicitudo).  While Apostolica Sollicitudo (AS) was only a few pages long, the rules by 2006 had grown substantially.  Bergolio’s major change will be examined.  But first, a few things about the Synod of Bishops.

The Synod members are comprised of i) Patriarchs from the Eastern Rite, ii) Bishops elected by national episcopal Conferences, iii) elected Bishops for nations without national Conferences, and iv) chosen Superiors Generals representing religious institutions.  These members represent “the whole Catholic episcopate” (AS I) wherein the precise membership rules are defined per Session type (General, Extraordinary and Special).

Further, the Pope is permitted to “increase the number of members… to the extent of fifteen percent”0AY with the 2006 rules specifying these are “appointed by the Supreme Pontiff” (Article 5, Section 4).  This minor stacking of the desk it is reasonable for an advisory function as the Pope has full power to select his advisors to begin with.

Bergolio’s zinger in Episcopalis Communio (EC) is “If it is expressly approved by the Roman Pontiff, the Final Document participates in the ordinary Magisterium.”  Here, Synod control via “increase… by fifteen percent” is no longer so innocuous.  As witnessed by the Amazon Synod, the entity represented is more of a biased episcopate rather than the “whole episcopate.”

Of pertinence, two of the necessary conditions for a valid Ecumenical Council are i) all of the Bishops must be invited and ii) a substantial “representative”¹⁷ number must actually attend.  Here, obviously, the first condition is not met.  Also note there is no difference between a Synod and a Council, the terms are synonymous.  Further, the Synod of Bishops represents the entire episcopate whose ruling can encompass the Universal Church.  In fine, EC sneaks the Bishops’ nose under a democratic Ecumenical Council’s tent.

From the AS era, the Pope can endow a Synod “with deliberative power”.  This is not problematic in the realm of advice, but it is another ballgame with participation in the Magisterium.  From the traditional perspective (and Model IV’s), deliberation power only resides in the College, not in the Synod of Bishops: the Pope cannot confer this power for this pertains to Divine Constitution.  If that is true, would the Final Document be invalid?

The other principle at play is papal acts are golden (outside of heresy).  The Final Document would thus retains validity whereas the joint Magisterial signing becomes a puppet show.  This question doesn’t arise with a Synod Exhortation, which is a separate papal act.  But it remains an issue for the Amazon Synod as the Exhortation was largely sanitized leaving only the Final Document smelling like a cesspool.

 

In terms of logic, supreme and infallible powers cannot be separated between two entities.  Infallibility represents a non-revocable decision with the impossibility of it being wrong.  Supreme power can only be overridden by another supreme decision.  The power of infallibility is a special form of supreme power.  To separate infallibility from supremacy would create two supremes, which is a contradiction.  So, to account for infallibility, does Model IV need compound infallibility?

Actually, the Church does not have the power of infallibility: it has the charisma of infallibility.  Accordingly, Model IV will be extended with the power of infallibility placed in the COLLEGE (Heaven’s view).  Though strictly speaking, this power belongs to God alone.  This power is projected onto the College via the power to determine decrees that are infallible, and onto the Supreme Pontiff to determine and enact the same such decrees.

What resides in the Church is the charisma of infallibility: when the Church makes an infallible pronouncement, God guarantees its veracity.  Though only the final result is infallibly guaranteed.  For example, the decree’s supporting argument can contain errors, which is goes back to the Church not having the power of infallibility, only the power to render infallible decrees.  While the Church has the grave obligation to exercise great prudence when making infallible statements, it isn’t necessary.  The human effort isn’t infallible – human understanding is hardly omniscience.  Infallibility is provided by God.

The above illustrated two ways that infallibility resides in the Church: the third is the Bishops are infallible in belief.  If all living Bishops believe a definable doctrine is to be definitively maintained, it becomes infallible.  Though as a practical matter, this condition is very difficult to verify.  Moreover, this case can be viewed as a virtual Council: the Pope and College scattered throughout the world.  For if they met as a Council, the doctrine would be immediately approved.

The traditional understanding of infallibility is somewhat different.  It has always been maintained that Ecumenical Councils are infallible, even by those who (years ago) denied the Pope was infallible.  Councils are considered to be intrinsically infallible, even with a fallible Pope.  After Vatican I, Councils have been said to come with a double guarantee of infallibility since papal infallibility is independent of conciliar action.

Though instead of depicting a double infallible guarantee on a truth table, the distinction between charisma and power of infallibility will be examined more closely.  It should be noted that this part of infallibility is not dogmatic: there is no definition describing how infallibility precisely works.

Question: do the periti participate in infallibility at an Ecumenical Council?  Surely, these experts perform an invaluable function as Bishops generally are not specialists.  Is this active participation in infallibility?  Charisma is a grace, a participation in life of God, which the periti are not void of.  How would the periti’s participation differ from the Bishops in terms of infallibility?  Also, why couldn’t the Pope, for example, receive a phone call pointing out an unnoticed flaw?

Grace is personal, not collective.  Ultimately, an infallible decision is only enacted by the Supreme Pontiff.  To condition this papal act on the College is to declare the Pope is not independent in the order of grace, which is as coherent as believing in a fallible Pope who is invariably correct.  No doubt, the Holy Spirit guides Councils to the truth, and collegiate participation is instrumental.  But when deliberating outside a Council on infallible matters, the Pope consults others, almost always.  On what grounds could these two cases of papal enactment be discriminated?

Council infallibility is said to be independently derivable from papal infallibility.  But it is doubtful the inner workings of infallibility could be defined without concluding papal infallibility.  Historically, the Church has made concessions to those who denied papal infallibility by saying Council infallibility doesn’t necessarily imply papal, but those are not definitive statements.  It seems nothing precludes the conclusion that infallibility resides only in the Pope.

 

Moving on, the above contained only a simplified presentation of Councils, which often included items such as disciplinary measures verses the purely doctrinal action described.  But these don’t impact what was said about “decrees.”  More significantly, Ecumenical Councils in practice have differed from the theoretical ideal in varying degree.  Can Model IV weather the storms of history?

The first anomaly is that several of the early Councils were largely void of collegiate determination.  The Pope had already made the decision(s) with Council being the vehicle to enforce conformity with the Bishops as a pre-step to promulgation.  As such, these Councils were fundamentally the Supreme Pontiff acting alone verses a functional compound supreme.

The second is the early Councils were principally comprised of the Eastern Bishops.  But determination only resides in the College.  The answer is there is no hard and fast requirement for what constitutes a valid College.  The mode of communication and travel from that era, plus the urgency of the issues, resulted in a “practical” College, which was distant from the ideal.

Another point is papal approbation doesn’t have to be a separate step.  When the Pope is directing the Council, which ideally he should (as at Vatican I in contrast to Vatican II), his approval can be implicit within the proceedings.

The last anomaly deals with the Second Ecumenical Council: Constantinople I (381).  This had no claim to be ecumenical, and its canons were consistently rejected by a series of Popes.  However, the clauses added to the Nicene Creed referring to the Holy Ghost were accepted, resulting in this Council being declared Ecumenical in the sixth century.  This case highlights the minimal papal involvement needed and the utter necessity of papal approval.

Constantinople I has relevance to Episcopalis Communio.  Per Model IV, the miracle that Bergoligo performed was conferring deliberation power to subsets of the College.  It is fair to count each such Synod as a unique instance having supreme power, albeit not full.  EC thus introduces a legion of supremes.  Constantinople I exemplifies the “final documents” are valid, with little doubt.  However, what Bergoligo most likely accomplished is the multiplication of puppet shows, not supremes.

This highlight a twist to the nebulous collegiality, whose objectionable aspect is what could be dubbed conferencism – the shift of power from the local Bishop to the Bishops Conference.  But for Bergoligo, collegiality has become a smoke screen to hide behind with his agenda passed off as the work of Bishop Synods.

One final comment on infallibility.  Vatican I did not tackle the question of Council infallibility [though the mysterious song, Call Me Infallible, was last heard there CallMeInfallible].  But another dimension is whether infallibility could operate outside of the realm of grace.  Could a Council be so corrupt and obstinate that God takes it out with, say, an earthquake?

Vatican II came close.  Its document are peppered with statements that originated with the intent of injecting heresy.  The Holy Ghost reframed from acting through nature, but upon its closure, Paul VI declared nothing infallible was defined there.  Thus, the first Ecumenical Council coming with the double guarantee of infallibility was the first in Church history to be declared fallible.  On a related front, will the heresy and blasphemy from the Amazon Synod be perpetuated, or will “nature” put a damper on it? 

Unsurprising surprisingly, Bergoligo thinks the pandemic is a remake of Alfred Hitchcock’s classic “The Birds” with the God of Surprises being on a lunch break.  While pinning a chastisement on a single event is simplistic, the Wuhan virus outbreak notably began apparently about thirty days after Bergoligo’s pagan worship service ended.

God’s desires to purify the world in stages.  There is a large distance, from here to the Era of Peace, from now to then, as current events amply demonstrate.  This pandemic has impacted virtually everyone, though mercifully only relatively few have died.  And so, the Triumph of the Immaculate Heart steadily approaches.  This in turn is connected to the Final Marian Dogma, the Virgin’s triple crowning.  And at this stage, curiously, the world has halted by a virus with a corona…